European Union (EU) law is based upon a liberalising imperative, the goal of which is to construct a single market between member states. Yet the EU is no ordinary trade pact, incorporating as it does a range of supranational political institutions and common policies in a range of areas beyond simple We analyse and compare two recent sets of health-related legal proceedings under EU law, the first of which challenges legislation passed by the Scottish Government to introduce minimum unit pricing for alcohol, and the second of which addresses the leg EU 2014 Tobacco Products Directive. We find, first, that EU law offers ample opportunities for corporations to challenge national health regulations; second, that there is significant scope for prohealth supranational regulations, but that these must be couched in the language of facilitating the single market, and are dependent on the political commitment of key policy actors; and, third, that this (limited) scope for pro-health supranational regulation distinguishes EU legal and political processes from those of other trade agreements and organisations.
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Introduction
The literature on trade and health has analysed the policy implications of a wide array of trade agreements and entities, including those of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and a number of plurilateral, regional and bilateral agreements (Friel et al., 2015) . It has further analysed the opportunities that trade law affords transnational corporations (TNCs) to challenge national-level health regulations (Jarman, 2015) . Many of the concerns raised about trade agreements, for example their implications for food hygiene standards, mirror debates which accompanied the construction of the European Union (EU) single-market. Yet the EU is different to more narrowlydrawn trade entities in the extent of its political and legal development, which allows for some
implications for health, while sharing some similarities, are therefore different to those purely tradefocussed agreements and organisations, such as the WTO, for which social concerns are peripheral.
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offers opportunities for corporations to use single-market law to attempt to remove national-level health regulations which can be portrayed as barriers to internal trade, it also potentially permits, under certain conditions, the creation of pro-health EU-level regulation. Central to such considerations is the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 1 in ruling on whether regulations at both the national and EU levels are compatible with EU law and the founding treaties on which the some of the key similarities and differences between EU processes and those of narrower trade agreements, we discuss the development of EU law in relation to the single market and the protection of health, and the relationship of this to its political processes, particularly with reference to the concepts of negative and positive integration.
The European Court and the EU integration process
The EU incorporates a range of political, legal and economic institutions, which both bind its member states and facilitate their interaction. Less than a federation, but more than an intergovernmental organisation, it has been characterised as a complex system of multi-level governance (Marks et al., 1996; Hooghe and Marks, 2001 ). The European Court has been central to the EU integration process. Indeed, during its formative stages, the EU integration process was EU making on the one hand, and the supranational nature of EU law on the other (Scharpf, 1996: 15;  see also Weiler, 1981; Scharpf, 2002) . Although intergovernmentalism in EU law making has since been superseded to a significant degree by the process of co-decision between the European P EP C E U C 2 (acting on proposals put forward by the European Commission), the opportunities for veto (Tsebelis, 2002; Holden and Hawkins, 2016) within the EU political system continue to make the creation of new supranational regulation more difficult than the removal of existing national-level regulations. EU legal processes, by contrast, have resulted in a powerful body of supranational law (based on the treaties) which is interpreted by the European Court and which binds its member states. Nevertheless, as will be elaborated below, such legal systems proceed not merely on the basis of obvious or neutral technical principles, but must be analysed in the context of broader political processes (Burley and Mattli, 1993: 44) .
A EU (Scharpf, 1996) . The distinction relates to the treatment of regulation in the attempt to remove regulatory differences between countries, which can act as barriers to the free movement of goods, 2 The Council of the European Union is composed of ministers from relevant depar governments (depending upon the policy area being discussed) meeting in a legislative capacity. Until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the Council of the European Union was referred to as the Council of Ministers.
services, people and capital on which the single market is founded. Positive integration refers to efforts to formulate common policies and standards that apply to all member states, whereas negative integration aims to remove barriers to integration and common action that arise from national regulations (Anderson, 2015: 4) . The difference between positive and negative integration T of a common EU standard on a particular product or good. The latter, in contrast, allows goods legally produced in one member state to be sold in all others, thereby removing impediments to trade that arise from different regulatory regimes. The European Court is a key site of negative integration, deepening economic integration via a series of rulings based on a broad interpretation of EU primary (i.e. treaty) and secondary (e.g. directives and regulations) law. A key feature of this process is the way in which it allows private actors wide scope to litigate via national courts.
Constitutionalisation, negative integration and corporate activity
To be effective, processes of trade liberalisation require a system that enables the monitoring and enforcement of agreements between parties. Without this, the incentive for parties to gain advantage by ignoring their obligations to open markets while others obey them will threaten to undermine the system (Stone Sweet, 2004: 8) . Crucially, this must involve some form of third-party dispute resolution, i.e. an arbitration mechanism or a court. For these reasons, the formation of the WTO led to a significant strengthening of the dispute resolution system compared to its forerunner in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In the EU, the European Court plays this role.
The Court, however, is more than simply an arbitration mechanism. Scholars have noted how, through successive rulings over time, it has come to operate as the constitutional court for the EU (Stone-Sweet, 2004) . However, in contrast to most national-level constitutions, the treaties that EU C building over market " Indeed, Stone Sweet (2004: 15) argues that a key motivation for litigating under EU law is for transnational economic actors to seek the removal Certain ECJ decisions in the 1960s on the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy represent key EU T s natural (citizens) and legal (corporations) persons to plead rights enshrined in EU law in national courts. The direct effect doctrine thus gradually constructed a set of individual rights from a body of law initially intended to apply only to states (Burley and Mattli, 1993: 60) . The doctrine of supremacy specifies that, where national law comes into conflict with EU law, the latter has primacy (Stone Sweet, 2004: 68 Stone Sweet (2004) notes how, in the process of negative integration, traders began by targeting the most obvious barriers to free movement, but that to the degree that these were removed by the Court, they then went on to target an ever-broader range of regulations. By the end of the 1980s, therefore, national rules on marketing rather than trading or production including those with particular importance for health, such as on minimum pricing, labelling and packaging requirements were being contested under EU law (Stone Sweet, 2004: 132) . Collectively, these cases helped to create a framework, based on legal precedent, for dealing with public health exceptions (Stone Sweet, 2004: 133) .
Health in the EU Treaties
When in the 1980s EU member states acted to deepen European integration via new treaties, they did so primarily on the basis of provisions aimed at deepening market integration (Anderson, 2015: 29) . A shift towards a more pro-market consensus in member states led them towards the further development of the internal market project via, initially, the Single European Act (SEA), which The EU treaties thus provide a limited foundation for health-protective legislation at the EU level and ect the health of their citizens at the national level, while simultaneously providing extensive scope for corporations to challenge regulations in court.
Below we investigate these issues further by examining two recent sets of legal proceedings before th E C T " G measures to set a minimum unit price (MUP) for alcohol, while the second involves a challenge to EU T P D TPD In order to explore the questions set out above, we take a comparative case study approach drawing upon relevant legal documents and other literature, examining first a case of the attempted overturn of (sub)national legislation and, second, a challenge to EU-level regulations.
We do this by analysing relevant legal documents and other texts. Literature searches were undertaken using Google Scholar and Web of Science databases in relation to the TPD and MUP cases to identify sources on the origins and development of the relevant legislation and legal cases.
A snowballing approach was then applied to studies returned in searches, as well as those known to the authors from their previous work in these areas, to identify additional sources. Relevant commentaries on contemporary events in the media and academic blogs were also consulted. P EU of the CJEU, were examined to identify the relevant legal basis of the legislation discussed and the points of contention in the subsequent litigation. Although the two legal cases are the focus of the analysis, we took a political science approach throughout, rather than conducting a narrowly legal analysis, attempting to understand the intersection of legal and political processes in producing policy outcomes.
Minimum unit pricing and alcohol industry litigation
The EU has regarded alcohol regulation primarily as a national responsibility, with EU-level initiatives taking the form not of harmonisation but of coordination, via the EU Alcohol Strategy for the period 2006 2012 (EC, 2006; Holden and Hawkins, 2016) . The expiry of the alcohol strategy, and the failure to renew it after 2012, reflect the relatively weak political priority given to alcohol policy. Attempts to mandate health-oriented labelling of alcohol products via harmonisation measures were dropped as a result of industry lobbying (Kurzer, 2013: 163; Cisneros Ornberg, 2013: 175) . Simultaneously, measures implemented by member states have been challenged by alcohol corporations for breeching single-market rules. Baumberg and Anderson (2008: 394) being -o competition policy.
Minimum pricing policies have been ruled by the European Court to be trade distorting and to constitute measures having equivalent effects to quantitative restrictions (Baumberg and Anderson, 2008: 393) . Minimum pricing policies for tobacco offer a precedent for the alcohol minimum pricing case considered here. Such measures have been ruled by the Court as unacceptable on the basis that increased taxation could achieve the same goals (Baumberg and Anderson, 2008: 395 96; McKee et al., 2010: 275) . The CJEU (2010) found that minimum pricing of tobacco contravened Directive 95/99 (pertaining to excise levels of tobacco) in that it removed the potential for imported products to compete on price with established products. The Court also held that the imposition of a minimum price went against the specific stipulation, in Article 9(1) of the directive, that manufacturers and importers retain the ability to set the maximum retail price of their products.
Increases in taxation, it stated, would not contravene single-market laws.
T " MUP as an attempt to use the specific and circumscribed powers devolved to it under the Scotland Act (1998) to respond to the very high rates of alcohol consumption and alcohol-related harm in Scotland, which are far in excess of the UK average (Scottish Government, 2008) . It is impossible to understand the dynamics of the MUP debate without placing it in the constitutional and political context of post-devolution Scotland (Holden and Hawkins, 2013) . Constitutionally, while taxation remained decided exclusively by the UK Government in Westminster, health matters were devolved to the Scottish Government. This removed the possibility for Scottish ministers to use increases in Duty and VAT levied on alcoholic beverages to address the issue of harms driven by the wide availability of cheap alcohol (Katikireddi et al, 2014) . It was also argued by public health campaigners that MUP would be more effective in addressing alcohol-related harms than taxed-based measures, especially among the most harmful drinkers (SHAAP 2010). In terms of politics, the Scottish National Party The judgement of the CJEU thus struck a careful balance. While clearly preferring taxation to MUP as the European judges gave the Court of Session sufficient latitude to find in favour of MUP. In its judgement, the CJEU recognised that member states remain sovereign in questions of public health in line with the principle of subsidiarity and that Scottish ministers, under the terms of devolution, are competent to enact measures such as MUP for the purpose of health protections (Andreangeli, 2016). The CJEU, however, was silent on the specific policy options available to the Scottish Government within the UK . This is unsurprising, given that such internal constitutional matters are regarded as being for member states to determine. In line with CJEU practice, it was ultimately for the Court of Session to determine whether MUP was more effective than taxation. For its part, the Court of Session found in favour of MUP not because it was the only measure open to the Scottish Government, but because it was the most effective. It nevertheless noted that the decision not to consider the precise " argument that increasing tax is a viable alternative, when the political reality is that it (Court of Session, 2016), i.e., UK VAT are set at Westminster, the Scottish government was unable to use the option of increasing tax. The complex multi-level machinery of EU governance thus produced an anomaly, which the European Court did not explicitly take into account, but which it was able to work around by referring the case back to the relevant member-state court. This outcome is perhaps consistent with the arguments of those, like Stone Sweet (2004), who have argued that the European Court is aware of the political implications of its decisions and takes these into account affords it. The decision was appealed to the UK Supreme Court by the SWA and, at the time of writing, we await the very final ruling in the case.
The 2014 Tobacco Products Directive and tobacco industry litigation
Since the 1990s the European Commission has been active in the area of tobacco control, and in contrast to alcohol policy it has steered through a series of directives related to labelling, product regulation, advertising and sponsorship, and taxation (see McKee et al., 2010: 259 60) . Given the limited competence of the EU in the area of health, all these directives, other than those on taxation, were based on treaty provisions relating to the internal market (McKee et al., 2010: 262) .
These directives have been subject to legal challenge by the tobacco industry and sympathetic member states. However, with some notable exceptions, the European Court has found in favour of the Commission, upholding health promotion measures (see McKee et al., 2010 , for a comprehensive summary).
Particularly significant is the Tobacco Advertising Directive (TAD) (98/43/EC), which was adopted almost 10 years after its initial proposal by the Commission, following significant opposition by the tobacco industry (Neuman et al., 2002) . It sought a complete ban on the marketing of tobacco products across all media (e.g. in print, on television, in cinemas) and at the point of sale and consumption (e.g. branded ashtrays, parasols and other items). The legal basis of the TAD was (Mandal et al., 2009; Hervey, 2001 ).
An amended Directive, focusing explicitly on cross-border advertising (i.e. television and magazines) was enacted in 2003, despite similar legal challenges (Boessen and Maarse, 2008) .
These cases highlight the importance of the legal basis of EU legislation and the principles of proportionality (that legislation should not go beyond what is necessary for the achievement of treaty objectives) and subsidiarity (that the EU shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States ) (Mandal et al., 2009 ). They also demonstrate the inclination of the judges to privilege these principles over the objective of securing public health. However, they established that legislation correctly adopted under the single market rules, for the intended market-oriented purpose of those articles, can have the (secondary) effect of harmonizing health policies (Boessen and Maarse, 2008) . Thus, they created a clear 
Discussion
The centrality of the EU single market within the European integration project is clearly evident in the area of public health. In the case of alcohol, and of minimum pricing more broadly, the potential for corporations to use EU law to challenge national-level regulation is clear, despite the CJEU nuanced judgement on the MUP case. Even in the case of tobacco control, where the Commission has played an agenda-setting role, the market-building foundations of the EU treaties take precedence over health objectives. Given the ambiguity and limited scope of the treaty provisions on public health, a series of EU tobacco directives have been based on single-market provisions in the treaties, since they deal with harmonisation of rules concerning product packaging and marketing (Anderson, 2015: 175) . This has opened them up to legal challenge on the grounds that they violate those same market principles, or that their objectives lie outside the legal remit of the treaty articles on which they are based. As McKee et al.
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, although they do acknowledge that single-market legislation can have the secondary effect of harmonising health policies. The market-building focus of EU law thus affords corporations ample opportunities to challenge both national-level health regulations and EU-level regulations, given that the latter must be based on single-market law.
N EU complex legislative machinery provide multiple opportunities for policy influence by corporations, H H 2016), corporations are able to challenge EU-level, national and sub-national legislation directly on EU T EU offers a powerful mechanism through which corporations may seek to challenge public health measures that run counter to their interests. Furthermore, the robust legal basis in the treaties and the existential importance of the single market to the European integration project mean that there is a strong bias towards trade facilitation in the jurisprudence of the Court, which may be seen as being undermined by health and social policies that seek to curtail health-harming industries.
Despite commitments to guaranteeing health in all policies, therefore, the limited explicit competence of the EU in health policy has important consequences. First, it means that healthrelevant harmonisation across the EU must be justified in terms of single-market rules. Second, it means that national-level health regulations must be constructed in the least trade-restrictive way possible and may be struck down by the Court if deemed inconsistent with this principle.
There is a clear difference, however, in the way the two product areas considered here have been approached at the EU level. In the case of tobacco, despite the bias towards market building, EU legal and political processes have provided significant opportunities for pro-health supranational regulation. While minimum pricing of tobacco products has been prohibited, directives enforcing minimum standards of tobacco control across the EU have been enacted in a way that has not been accomplished for the field of alcohol policy. In the case of alcohol, the Commission has relied heavily on soft law approaches, such as information sharing and voluntary agreements among civil society and business. Since the expiry of the EU alcohol strategy in 2012, there is no significant framework for tackling alcohol harms at the EU level. Alcohol policy has therefore been left more to the member state (and sub-state) level. Consequently, while in the area of tobacco control the European
Court has played a role in the interpretation of EU-level law, in the realm of alcohol policy it has focussed on the compatibility of domestic laws with EU law. Thus, while in both policy areas the Court continues to play a crucial role in determining what measures are compatible with singlemarket requirements and the free movement of goods, the potential for negative integration is much clearer in the case of alcohol than tobacco. While in the MUP alcohol case discussed here the Court seems to have taken a nuanced approach to the complex national and sub-national political context " powers), there is currently no prospect of any meaningful health-related regulation of alcohol at the EU level. The different outcomes between the two policy areas thus reflect the different approaches to these products by the European Commission and member-state governments, whereby alcohol is seen to be less harmful than tobacco (and alcohol corporations are treated as partners capable of helping to reduce harm) . It demonstrates that EU law can be used to construct supranational public health regulations, but that whether or not this occurs depends on the political will of the Commission and of member states.
The EU is consistent with more narrowly-drawn trade agreements and organisations in that the fundamental principles underlying EU law are premised upon market building. The single market is the cornerstone of the EU and the source of much of the jurisprudence of the Court. Many of the core principles of EU law, as well as the rights enjoyed by both corporate actors and EU citizens, are derived from Court rulings on different aspects of single-market law. While some of these decisions have been socially progressive, extending for example the right of movement for dependents across member states and equal pay for women (Stone Sweet, 2004) , the centrality of the single market to the European integration project means that trade is the primary lens through which policy and law are viewed, and trade facilitation becomes the key objective to be pursued. Yet EU processes differ from those of purely trade-focussed agreements and organisations in their implications for health. Other goals can be accommodated where they are able to demonstrate their compatibility with the overarching objective of EU trade liberalisation. Thus supranational regulation to protect health, including that which might offset the effects of negative market-building integration, is possible where sufficient political will exists among key policy actors.
The comparison of EU legal proceedings with dispute-resolution processes in other international trade and investment forums is instructive. In the WTO, for example, only states have legal standing to initiate disputes, although corporations can and do lobby sympathetic governments to undertake such action on their behalf (Eckhardt et al., 2015) . In many bilateral and regional trade and investment agreements, however, corporations can initiate disputes with governments directly through investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) procedures , just as they can under EU law. In contrast to ISDS mechanisms, however, E C direct effect does not only provide opportunities for corporations to utilise EU law, but also provides citizens with fundamental rights that can be pleaded before national courts under EU law.
Further, the political roles of the Commission, the Council and the Parliament are crucial in producing EU-level law that, at its best, can construct a health-protective floor across all member states. This contrasts starkly with the WTO, which, despite the existence of health exceptions in its agreements, has failed to attach even the most basic common health or social standards, such as core labour standards, to those agreements (Peels and Fino, 2015) 5 . Mega-regional trade and investment agreements that have been the subject of recent negotiation, such as the Trans-Atlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), do include provisions for regulatory cooperation , which are similar in some respects to the formulation of common standards in the EU. However, these do not envisage the creation of political institutions akin to those of the EU, and have prompted concern that they may lead to a lowering, rather than simply a harmonisation, of standards (Holden and Hawkins, in press ).
Conclusion
In answer to the three research questions posed at the beginning of this article, our analysis suggests, first, that EU law offers ample opportunities for corporations to challenge national health regulations; second, that there is significant scope for pro-health supranational regulation in the EU, but that such regulation must be couched in the language of facilitating the single market, and is 5 Some bilateral and regional trade agreements do include provisions on minimum labour standards and on F agreements, see Holden and Hawkins (in press ).
dependent on the political commitment of key policy actors; and, third, that this (limited) scope for pro-health supranational regulation distinguishes EU legal and political processes from those of most other trade agreements and organisations, which include exceptions for action at the national level to protect health, but which currently provide no opportunity to attach common minimum health standards to their trade provisions.
In different ways, the legal cases reviewed here demonstrate the predominance of market principles within the European integration project, and its relevance for health policy at both the member state and EU levels. They demonstrate also the interconnection between legal judgements and the wider political agenda. Despite its market-EU developed political institutions allow for greater health-protective legislation at the supranational level than more narrowly-drawn trade agreements and organisations. The importance of the political commitment of key policy actors is clear in this regard, where there is evidence of substantially greater political will to pursue regulation of tobacco products at the EU level when compared to the alcohol field, with EU regulation of tobacco exceeding national measures in some cases. However, even then this has had to be couched in the language of market facilitation. The alcohol case demonstrates both a lack of political ambition at the EU level to enact effective common measures to reduce harm, but also that national-level regulation is permissible if the proportionality test is met. However, the history of both tobacco and alcohol litigation suggests that certain types of regulation will be subject to particular scrutiny, with an underlying bias against minimum pricing of health-harming products evident. 
